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This thesis examines the role of the Project Manager (PM) and his staff, as 
well as the supporting security assistance agencies that supported the PM, during the 
conduct of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of the Multiple Launch Rocket System 
(MLRS) to Israel. The role of the PM and his staffis evaluated from the perspective 
of the functional management responsibilities they assumed during this FMS case. 
It further investigates the roles of the security assistance agencies which were 
involved in the FMS process and how the interactions of those agencies supported the 
PM in this endeavor. The roles and responsibilities of the various agencies involved 
in a typical case are examined and compared to this case. The ethical considerations 
which faced the Project Management Office (PMO) in this particular case are 
addressed. An examination of the impact thaJ FMS has on the industrial base is 
presented. Lessons which were learned from this case are discussed and developed 
into recommendations for improvement of the FMS and Foreign Military Financing 
Programs (FMFP). Additionally, recommendations are made for further research and 
study in the area of FMS, roles and responsibilities of affected agencies, achieving 
foreign policy objectives and increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of concerned 
agencies. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The role of leadership in the international community has taken on a new 
meaning for the United States in the post Cold-War Era. American engagement and 
leadership are just as important today as they were during the Cold-War Era because 
we confront an interdependent world in which the line between our concerns at home 
and our interests abroad is increasingly blurred. The prosperity of our entrepreneurs, 
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workers, and farmers relies on their ability to gain access to, and compete in, the 
global marketplace. Our industrial base is at the very heart of this theme for the 
future of American enterprise. 
A critical test of our leadership will be our willingness to dedicate the 
resources necessary to protect the security and prosperity of our people. The current 
administration, as well as those of the future, must demonstrate a willingness to shape 
a world which remains conducive to American interests and consistent with our core 
values of free markets and open societies. It is only with conviction that the 
Legislative and the Executives branches of our government must allow Americans to 
prosper in world markets. Each year as the budget process is begun, it must be 
undertaken with the interests of the American worker in mind, keeping American jobs 
in the forefront of our foreign policy, along with the safety and security of ourselves 
and our allies. We must factor these issues, and the issues of non-proliferation, a 
clean environment, and the reduction of crime into our budgeting deliberations. 
The end of the Cold War brought security to the United Sates at a tremendous 
price. It has been replaced by a struggle to create and strengthen democratic 
institutions of government and market economies in the key regions of the world. 
The United States is leading the move toward creating a new international system 
which has democracy as its foundation. The United States will clearly benefit from 
the consolidation of democratic economies as the threat of war is diminished, 
expansion of economic opportunities for us and our allies on a range of issues of 
direct concern to the American people is dramatically increased. These issues cross 
the traditional boundaries of economic, social, and cultural differences, seeking 
economic exchanges within democratic governments. 
Domestically, a sharp decrease in defense budgets, when combined with the 
diminishing defense industrial base, has created a heightened interest in the foreign 
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sale of military equipment, defense articles and services, military construction, and 
training. Economic conditions world-wide have contributed to increased sales of 
military equipment at record levels. The U.S. has always sought to maintain the 
security of itself and that of its allies. It is for this reason that the process of the 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of U.S. equipment has become a topic of increased 
interest in recent years. The process ofF oreign Military Sales is an integral part of 
American Foreign Policy, and is one which is relied upon by many customer countries 
and American business enterprises. The Department of Defense (DoD), as the 
executive agent for the FMS process, plays an integral part in this process. 
Incorporated into the military modernization planning for many allied 
countries are the plans to upgrade conventional artillery weapons delivery systems. 
This modernization may include upgrades from towed artillery to self-propelled, or 
from tube artillery to rockets. In some instances these upgrades have included the 
purchase and integration of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) into their 
inventory to complement their existing artillery. Prior to the Foreign Military Sale of 
the Multiple Launch Rocket System, older, towed and self-propelled artillery systems 
were available to customer countries. These FMS cases were administered with little 
or no Project Management Office (PMO) involvement, since the items were older, 
and had been in the Department of Defense (DoD) inventory for many years. In 
addition, logistical support was relatively simple for these older systems. 
After the resounding victory of U.S. and coalition forces during Desert Storm, 
there has been a surge ofinterestin the Foreign Military Sale of new U.S. military 
technology. In many instances, our allies began to express interest in the weapon 
systems that had proven themselves for the first time in modem warfare. One such 
weapon system is the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). This weapon system 
proved itself by its firepower, lethality, agility, and supportability on the modem 
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battlefield. As a result of increased interest on a global scale, PMs are now realizing 
the additional responsibilities that are placed upon them by the prospects of Foreign 
Military Sales. 
Regarding the FMS of new production equipment such as the Multiple Launch 
Rocket System, the functional management role of the PM has been poorly-defined. 
Despite project management having been in place for several years, and the security 
assistance management efforts undertaken by the vast infrastructure in the Defense 
Department, the role of the PM in this process is at best unclear. In fact, little 
guidance is given to establish the role of the Project Manager in the Foreign Military 
Sales of new equipment. In comparison, the task of managing the sale of older, 
obsolescent equipment at the U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM) is accom-
plished by the Security Assistance Management Directorate (SAMD). In these 
instances there is virtually no interface between the customer and the PM. The PM 
must therefore find the necessary resources within his own office to support the FMS 
burden, from project assets. 
When viewing the FMS of new weapon systems to foreign governments, the 
PM plays a critical role in the procedure. Analysis indicates a need to determine the 
appropriate functional management role for the PM and his staff, as well as the 
security assistance community throughout the Defense Department. Proper assign-
ment of roles and responsibilities will not only streamline the FMS process, make it 
more efficient and cost-effective, but will also serve to attract more customers to FMS 
as part of PM acquisition strategies. This lesson may be applied not only to the FMS 
of new weapons, but also to the sale of older equipment and other military hardware. 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
The primary objective of this thesis is to determine the most appropriate 
functional management role for the PM during the Foreign Military Sale of new 
4 
production weapon systems. The secondary objective herein will be to establish the 
appropriate supporting roles and responsibilities of the various security assistance 
agencies who are intended to support the PM in this endeavor. The role of the PM 
will be analyzed by a case study of the FMS of the MLRS to Israel. The FMS of the 
MLRS to Israel highlights some unique features of the FMS process and provides 
some valuable insights into the functional management aspects ofFMS in general. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research provided herein will answer the following primary and subsidiary 
questions: 
1. Primary 
What is the most appropriate functional management role for the PM in the 
Foreign Military Sale of new production weapon systems? 
2. Subsidiary 
What security assistance agencies were involved in the FMS of the MLRS to 
Israel and did they provide adequate support to the PM in this transaction? 
What activities did the PM actually perform that may have been outside his 
scope of responsibility? 
What ethical considerations did the PM encounter with regard to his roles and 
responsibilities in this cases? 
Whose responsibility is it to protect the data/intellectual property rights of the 
defense contractor in this case? 
Is the sale ofMLRS to Israel representative of the future of our FMS program? 
What unique features does this case include when compared to other FMS 
cases? 
What were the lessons learned from this FMS case? 
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E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis is based on determining the appropriate functional roles of the 
Project Manager and his staff, and the supporting security assistance agencies 
associated with the Foreign Military Sales of the MLRS to Israel. I will seek to 
highlight any redundancy or gaps in the security assistance management system as it 
currently exists, and make any recommendations for the assumption of leadership in 
the absence of clear guidance. I plan to assess the security assistance process, 
highlight any lessons learned from this case, and recommend some possible changes 
that may benefit those agencies concerned. 
This research is limited to the Foreign Military Sale of the Multiple Launch 
Rocket System. This research will be viewed as the FMS of a new production 
weapon system to a foreign government. References will be made to relevant laws, 
regulations, and policies which have application to the military assistance process. 
The agencies which contribute to the management of security assistance will also be 
discussed. This thesis will closely examine the details of the most recent FMS case 
involving the sale ofthe MLRS to the Government oflsrael (GOI). Since some of the 
unique features of the Israeli FMS case are still pending, some information remains 
unavailable. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
Research included a thorough review of all available literature on the role of 
the Project Manager in the FMS process, and applicable laws, regulations and policies 
which govern the security assistance process. Roles ofthe various security assistance 
agencies were then reviewed in pertinent regulations. An historical and conceptual 
framework was then established regarding our relationship with Israel, both on a 
political and military level. Information was obtained from the Defense Logistics 
Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) which pertained to the FMS process and 
) 
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cases in general. Interviews were conducted with personnel from the following 
agencies/locations: U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM), Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA), U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), 
the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM) and the U.S. 
prime contractor for the MLRS, Loral-Vought Systems, Dallas, TX. 
After all of the information was gathered and the research completed, the 
information was coalesced to make a determination regarding the appropriate roles 
and responsibilities of the PMO and the security assistance agencies involved in FMS. 
Those determinations were then applied to the FMS case of the Multiple Launch 
Rocket System to Israel. Using this case as a basis, determinations were made as to 
whether the process worked properly, or whether changes to the FMS process should 
be made to improve efficiency. An examination of the ethical considerations which 
faced the PM in this case was also conducted and discussed. Analysis of the effects 
of the FMS process on the industrial base was also given, from the perspective of both 
the contractor and the government. Some conclusions and lessons learned were then 
provided to enhance the security assista~ce management posture of the agencies 
concerned, with particular emphasis on the PMO .. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I discusses the purpose, background and objective of this thesis. 
Chapter II reviews the U.S. security assistance philosophy, the FMS process, 
and the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) as it applies to this case. This 
chapter will also serve to delineate the roles and responsibilities of the various 
security assistance agencies involved in the case. 
Chapter III closely examines the FMS case of the MLRS to Israel and our 
relationship with them in terms of our evolving military attachment to them. It 
presents the details of the MLRS case and some of the peculiarities of the sale, as well 
7 
as the implications that were created as a result. The case was examined from the 
perspective of the PM, how the functional management roles were fulfilled, and 
whether the supporting security assistance agencies performed adequately. 
Chapter IV closely scrutinizes the roles of the individual security assistance 
agencies, and determines whether the agencies met the needs of the PM in this 
endeavor. It closely examines each phase of the FMS process to determine whether 
the system has worked the way it was intended, or if adjustments are needed. It 
examines the functional management role of the PM and his staff throughout the 
process. This chapter also highlights some of the ethical considerations which faced 
the PM, and the implications of the sale on the industrial base, the contractor, and the 
government. 
Chapter V provides some recommendations to improve the FMS and FMFP 
processes as they relate to the Project Manager and the security assistance community 
at large. It further outlines some of the functional responsibilities which should be 
established in the FMS process. It defines the functional management role of the PM 
and his relationship with the security assistance community. This chapter concludes 
with recommendations for further study. 
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II. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY 
A. BACKGROUND 
The transfer of defense articles, defense services, military training, and 
economic assistance is by definition the providing of security assistance. These are 
the tools with which we carry out our foreign and national security policy. The 
following extract from the Bush Administration's 1993 budget request justification 
to Congress outlines the general objectives of security assistance and their direct 
linkage to foreign policy: 
Our security assistance programs promote the full range of U.S. national 
interest by serving the following objectives: 
• Increasing the ability of U.S. security partners to deter and defend 
against aggression, and to shoulder more of the common defense 
burden; 
• Helping to maintain strong and cohesive defense arrangements with 
friends and allies, and to secure access to important military facilities 
around the world; 
• Promoting regional stability by arms transfer controls of the volume 
and types of weaponry provided to security assistance recipients; 
• Strengthening economies of countries with which the U.S. has a 
security relationship and, when necessary, helping those governments 
move toward market-oriented economic policies; and 
• Fostering human rights, democratic values and institutions [Ref. 11: p. 
1]. 
The current Administration also embraces this policy regarding security assistance, 
and has not made significant changes to its tenets. 
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The United States offers security assistance to strengthen the national security 
of friendly nations, support existing or prospective democratic institutions and 
market-oriented economies; it is not totally an altruistic effort on our part. In both its 
military and economic components, security assistance provides continuity in 
American foreign policy and helps build mutual security and stable relationships. A 
brief description of security assistance program components is provided below [Ref. 
4:pp. 41-45]. 
B. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM COMPONENTS 
1. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Construction 
Sales Program 
FMS is a non-appropriated program through which eligible foreign 
governments purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States 
Government. The purchasing government pays all of the costs that may be associated 
with the sale. In effect, there is a signed government-to-government agreement 
(normally documented on a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA)) between the U.S. 
Government and the foreign government. Each LOA is commonly referred to as a 
"case" and is assigned a unique case identifier for accounting purposes. Under FMS, 
military articles and services may be provided from Department of Defense (DOD) 
stocks, or from new procurement. Each is handled under applicable laws and 
regulations. If the source of supply is new procurement, on the basis of having a LOA 
which has been accepted by the foreign government, the U.S. Government agency or 
military department assigned cognizance for this "case" is authorized to enter into a 
contractual arrangement with the U.S. industry in order to provide the service or 
article requested. 
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Foreign Military Construction Sales involves the sale of design and 
construction services to eligible purchasers. The construction sales agreement and 
sales procedures generally follow the same procedures as FMS. 
2. Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) 
FMFP has undergone considerable changes in recent years. At present, the 
program consists of Congressionally-appropriated grants and loans which enable 
foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training through 
either FMS or direct commercial sales (DCS) channels. The FMFP originally served 
to provide an effective means for easing the transition from grant aid to cash 
purchases. In recent years, however, the grant element has grown substantially. As 
a reference, the Congress provided a total of $3.77 billion for the FY 1995 FMFP 
appropriation in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act [Ref. 20:p. I]. This 
represents a substantial investment by the U.S. taxpayer in the area of security 
assistance. 
3. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 
DCS is a direct commercial sale licensed under the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA), made by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer. Unlike the procedures 
used for FMS, direct commercial sales transactions are not administered by DOD and 
do not involve a government-to-government agreement. Instead, the U.S. government 
"control" procedure is conducted through the office of Defense Trade Control in the 
Department of State. The FY 1995 DCS totals were estimated at $3.56 billion [Ref. 
20:p. 2]. 
4. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
The IMET Program provides training in the Untied States, and in some cases 
training in overseas u:s. military facilities, to selected foreign military and related 
civilian personnel on a grant basis. While this program has relatively moderate costs, 
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it has a tremendous amount of importance attached to it by the Executive Branch of 
Government. The Fiscal Year 1995 appropriation of$25 .5 million gained the govern-
ment tremendous returns in the area of engagement and involvement with foreign 
governments [Ref. 20:p. 2]. A typical IMET program costs $100,000 a year or less; 
only 14 programs cost more than $1 million, and even the largest is less than $3.4 
million. An IMET program consists of all of the military education and training for 
a particular country during a year. Over 5,000 students from nearly 100 countries are 
trained each year with IMET funds. For many U.S. Ambassadors or regional military 
Commanders in Chief, the benefit of a small IMET program has often advanced much 
larger American interests, such as trade and investment or political cooperation. 
5. The Economic Support Fund (ESF) 
The ESF was established to promote economic and political stability in areas 
where the U.S. has special and security interests and where the U.S. has determined 
that economic assistance can be useful in helping to secure peace or to avert a major 
economic or political crisis. ESF is a flexible economic instrument which is made 
available on a grant or loan basis for a variety of purposes, including balance of 
payment support, infrastructure, and other capital and technical assistance develop-
ment projects. While a substantial amount goes for balance of payment type aid, the 
ESF also provides for programs aimed at primary needs in health, education, 
agriculture, and family planning. Congress has also made it clear that the funds from 
this account should be used, to the maximum extent possible, for the development of, 
and support to equitable growth that helps to meet the basic needs of the poor. ESF 
accounted for a sizable $2.37 billion in FY 1995, but its effects were extremely far-
reaching [Ref. 20:p. 2]. The fund is administered by the Agency for International 
Development (AID) under the policy direction of the Secretary of State. 
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6. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
PKO was established to provide for that portion of security assistance devoted 
to such programs as the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and the U.S. 
contribution to the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Appropriations for 
PKO amounted to $75 million for FY 1995 [Ref. 20:p. 2]. Other programs supported 
with these funds included U~N. peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, El Salvador, 
Russia, and Haiti. 
7. Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Fund (NPD) 
The NPD was implemented in 1994 to deter the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. Funding has been set aside to reduce and restructure Russia's 
strategic nuclear force, and also support the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Khazakhstan. It will also establish controls for destabilizing weapons systems and 
promote control and security in regions of tension. The FY 1995 appropriation for 
NPD was $50 million [Ref. 20:p. 2]. 
C. . U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS FOR SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE 
The foundation of the U.S. security assistance program is the law which 
contains the security assistance authorizations, appropriations, restrictions, and 
reporting requirements. These laws reflect how the three branches of the federal 
government interact and how the process of security assistance is accomplished. To 
further explain this relationship, a brief discussion of the roles of each branch with 
regard to security assistance is presented below [Ref. 4:pp. 76-82]. Figure 1 depicts 
the U.S. government organization for security assistance. 
1. Executive Branch 
The Executive is the most heavily-involved branch of government in the area 
of security assistance pro grams. 
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Figure 1. United States Government Organization for Security Assistance 
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It is not only responsible for the foreign policy direction of the federal government, 
but also for the implementation of the various aspects of our security assistance 
programs. The Executive Branch organizations which impact upon the process of 
implementing security assistance are discussed below. 
a. Office of the President of the United States 
The Constitution establishes the President as the Chief Executive and, 
by inference, the chief arbiter in matters of foreign policy. The President may also, 
with the consent of the Senate, enter into treaties with other nations or organizations 
on behalf of the United States. The President may appoint and receive ambassadors, 
and conduct any of the functions required to carry out U.S. foreign policy. It is the 
President who recommends the annual U.S. security assistance program/budget to the 
Congress for its consideration, and executes the program once it becomes law. 
Finally, the President maintains oversight authority for the security assistance 
program in its entirety. Within the Executive Office of the President, the two organ-
izations which impact security assistance programs are the National Security Council 
(NSC) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
b. Department of State 
The Secretary of State has a statutory responsibility to provide 
continuous supervision and general direction of economic and military assistance, 
military education and training, as well as overseeing sales and export programs. The 
Secretary has responsibility to oversee the conduct of existing security assistance 
programs, determining whether new programs are needed, as well as ensuring that 
current programs are properly administered. The primary agencies which have 
cognizance in the security assistance area within the Department of State are the 
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA). Within the Bureau ofPolitico-Military Affairs, the Office of Defense Trade 
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Controls is responsible for the licensing of exports of arms and materials on the U.S. 
Munitions List, issuing the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (IT AR), and 
preparing the commercial sales reports which are required by Congress. The Office 
of Defense Relations and Security Assistance, also within the Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs, is responsible for the day-to-day direction of the Security Assistance 
Program. It reviews all security assistance matters which require State Department 
attention, and serve as the link between the State Department and Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA). 
c. Department of the Treasury 
The role of the Treasury Department in the management of security 
assistance matters falls into three major functions. These are: Financial Agent, Arms 
Import Control Agent and Export Control Licenser. As Financial Agent for the U.S. 
government, the Treasury Department has responsibility to monitor the Foreign 
Military Sales Trust Account. It also has a fiduciary interest in the appropriated 
programs of security assistance as well. The Arms Control Export Act confers upon 
the President the function of controlling the import of arms, ammunition, and 
implements of war, including technical data, into the United States. This function has 
been delegated from the President to the Secretary of the Treasury (Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms). The designation of defense articles or services 
subject to import control must have the concurrence of the Secretaries of State and 
Defense [Executive Order No. 11958]. The U.S. Customs Service, Department of the 
Treasury, is responsible for monitoring munitions control, export licenses and their 
use. 
d. Department of Commerce 
The U.S. Commerce Department is involved in security assistance 
management in many ways. It is the oversight agency for dual-use technology, for 
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which items are maintained on the Commodity Control List. The U.S. Commerce 
Department is also heavily involved in issues of technology transfer. It serves as the 
oversight agency of the Executive Branch regarding transfer of technology and dual-
use technology matters. 
e. Department of Defense 
The Secretary of Defense has the responsibility bestowed upon him by 
the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) for the 
following security assistance functions: 
1. The determination of military end-item requirements 
2. The procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its 
integration with service programs. 
3. The supervision of end-item use by recipient countries. 
4. The supervision of training of foreign military and related civilian 
personnel. 
5. The movement and delivery of military end-items. 
6. The establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery, and 
allocation of military equipment. 
7. Within the Department of Defense, the performance of any other func-
tions with respect to the furnishing of military assistance, education, 
training, sales, and guarantees. 
The Dob agency which interprets executive policy and develops 
Defense Department security assistance policies and programs is the Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA). The DSAA is a separate agency under the direction, 
authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and receives 
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policy direction and staff supervision from the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(International Security Affairs). The principle functions of the DSAA include: 
1. Administration and supervision of security assistance planning and 
programs; 
2. Coordination of the formulation and execution of security assistance 
programs with other governmental agencies; 
3. Conducting international logistics and sales negotiations with foreign 
countries; 
4. Serving as the DoD focal point for liaison with U.S. industry with 
regard to security assistance activities; 
5. Managing the credit financing program; 
6. Developing and promulgating security assistance procedures, such as 
the Security assistance Management Manual (SAMM); 
7. Developing and operating the data processing system and maintaining 
the macro database for the security assistance program; and, 
8. Making determinations with respect to the allocation ofFMS adminis-
trative funds. 
The Defense Department also has oversight responsibility for all of the 
overseas Security Assistance Offices (SAOs), although these organizations are not in 
the Defense Department. SAOs manage all of the aspects of country security 
assistance programs to include fiscal, logistical and contractual functions. 
f. Department of the Army 
The Department of the Army (DA);Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Logistics (Security Assistance), [ADCSLOG] (SA) is responsible for providing 
oversight to the process of implementation of all Army security assistance activities, 
to include LOA development during the FMS process. The U.S. Army Material 
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Command (AMC) is responsible for the proper implementation, administration, 
execution and management of Army FMS cases. 
The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) is 
subordinate to AMC and is responsible for implementing all FMS activities. 
Regarding FMS cases, USASAC reviews all FMS cases for completeness and 
accuracy and forwards them to DSAA for approval. 
The U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM) Security Assistance 
Management Directorate (SAMD) serves as the focal point for the preparation and 
administration of the FMS program [Ref. 37:p. 2]. Also co-located with MICOM is · 
. the Program Executive Office (PEO), Tactical Missiles. It is incumbent upon the 
Project Manager to work closely with the MICOM SAMD on matters regarding 
security assistance and FMS/FMFP transactions. Figures 2 and 3 depict the U.S. 
Army organization for security assistance, and the organization of Program Executive 
Offices, Tactical Missiles, respectively. 
g. Other Services 
The other services are simi.larly staffed to support their own security 
assistance efforts. 
2. Legislative Branch 
In terms of security assistance, Congressional power and influence are exerted 
in several ways [Ref. 4:p. 78]: 
1. Development, consideration and action on legislation to establish or 
amend basic security assistance authorization acts; 
2. Enactment of appropriations acts; 
3. Passage of Joint Continuing Resolutions to permit the incurrence of 
obligations to carry on essential security assistance program activities 
until appropriation action is complete. 
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4. Conduct of hearings and investigations into special areas of interest, to 
include instructions to the General Accounting Office (GAO), the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) to accomplish special reviews; 
5. Review of proposed arms transfers (FMS, DCS, Third Country 
Transfers, and Leases); 
6. Ratification of treaties which may have security assistance implications. 
The primary committees of the Congress with security assistance legislation 
responsibility are: 
a. Authorizations 
1. House ofRepresentatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs (with various 
Subcommittees); and, 
2. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (with various Subcommittees). 
b. Appropriations 
1. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations (Subcom-
mittee on Foreign Operations); and, 
2. Senate Committee on Appropriations (Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations). 
3. Judicial Branch 
Normally, the courts have had limited involvement in the day-to-day activities 
of security assistance, but since several clauses of the AECA were invalidated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court (Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha [1983 ]), 
their involvement has grown. Judicial involvement may also become possible when 
a contractor provides goods or services under a DoD contract for an FMS customer 
to resolve a dispute. 
22 
D. SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION AND POLICY 
Four of the seven security assistance programs must be authorized and 
approved. These are: Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), 
and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Appropriation authority is not required for 
FMS or DCS, since appropriated funds are not used in these types of transactions. 
1. The Foreign Assistance Act 
The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) was originally enacted on 4 September 
1961 to provide broad guidance over a number of security assistance programs. 
Today, it is the authorizing legislation for IMET, ESF, PKO, overseas security 
assistance program management, transfer of excess defense articles (EDA), and other 
foreign assistance programs. 
2. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 
The AECA came into being under the title of Foreign Military Sales Act 
(FMSA) of 1968. Prior to 1968, foreign military sales came under the FAA. The 
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 changed the 
title of the FMSA to the AECA. The AECA is the statutory basis for the conduct of 
FMS, funding for FMFP, and the control of commercial sales of defense articles and 
services. 
E. ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 
1. Conduct of DoD Personnel in Security Assistance Positions 
The affairs of the United States Government, including security assistance and 
foreign military sales, are conducted by persons appropriately authorized to act on 
behalf of the Government. "The responsibility of those so authorized is akin to that 
of the fiduciary, i.e., a person holding a special relationship of trust, confidence, or 
duty to act primarily for another's benefit". [Ref. 4: p. 459] Under Title 18, United 
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States Code, Graft and Bribery laws are enforced in federal courts. Bribery is the 
corrupt giving or offering of anything of value to a public official with intent to: 
1. Influence official acts; 
2. Have him perpetrate fraud or set up the opportunity for fraud; or 
3. Have that official do anything contrary to his public duty. 
The reciprocal of bribery is graft - the seeking by a public official of something of 
value in order to assure that his public acts will conform to those desired by the 
prospective donor. Both bribery and graft are prohibited by Title 18. 
2. Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), DoD 5500. 7-R 
This regulation serves as the single source on standards of ethical conduct and 
ethics guidance for all DoD personnel. Some of the areas the are covered in the JER 
that are related to security assistance and specifically foreign military sales are: 
1. Ethical Conduct 
2. Official and personal participation in non-official activities 
3. Travel Benefits 
4. Conflict of Interest 
This regulation gives broad guidance to DoD employees in routine matters where 
ethical questions may be raised, but the JER does not specifically address conduct 
with foreign governments as it relates to FMS or security assistance. 
F. SUMMARY 
American leadership requires that we are prepared to back our diplomacy with 
credible threats of force. To this end, the U.S. military remains the most powerful, 
effective fighting force in the world. When our vital interests are at stake, we will be 
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prepared to defend them alone. In some instances, we can leverage our power and 
resources through alliances and multinational institutions. We have a stake in helping 
our allies to strengthen their own defenses so that they can share the common defense 
burden. Through the seven components of our security assistance program (Foreign 
Military Sales and Foreign Military Construction Sales, Foreign Military Financing 
Program, International Military Training and Education Program, Peacekeeping 
Operations, Economic Support Fund, and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
Fund) we accomplish our foreign policy objectives worldwide. The relative 
importance of these programs cannot be understated, especially in times of shrinking 
domestic defense budgets, and defense industrial base. The U.S. is constantly looking 
to strengthen the security of our allies and promote the benefits of free markets and 
open societies. The laws which govern us in implementing our policies abroad serve 
as the foundation for these programs.· Participation by the members of the Executive, 
Legislative, and Judicial Branches of our government ensures that our policies are 
carried out with legitimacy. The U.S. is the world leader in many areas, including 
arms export and control, due principally to our commitment to supporting the 
democratic goals of our friends and allies. 
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III. THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CASE: MLRS SALE TO ISRAEL 
A. PURPOSE 
This chapter reviews the history of our relationship with Israel, both on a 
historical level, and from the perspective of our foreign policy with that country. It 
reviews the policies and processes involved in the FMS of the Multiple Launch 
Rocket System. The FMS process is structured and evaluated as the LOA is 
developed and passes through successive stages. The chapter concludes by presenting 
some of the significant aspects, and unique features of the FMS case of the MLRS 
with Israel. 
B. U.S.- ISRAELI RELATIONS 
1. History 
In the American system of foreign policy, the President has the ultimate 
decision-making power; and all other actors have supporting roles. This does not 
imply that what a President wants done can always become reality. The various elites 
with whom the chief executive must contend in framing the foreign policy direction 
of the nation cannot be ignored. The information they communicate, the views they 
espouse, and the personal agendas they pursue are critical to what presidents under-
stand, and decide to do in the conduct of foreign affairs. When they disagree among 
themselves or with the president, as happened during the Truman administration, 
during the first Nixon administration, and in the first years under Reagan, the 
presidential direction given U.S. policy toward the Middle East may seem weak, 
indecisive, and even incoherent [Ref. 12:p. 14]. On the other hand, when there is 
unity at the top, as in Reagan and Nixon's second terms or under the Carter 
administration, U.S. policy will have a very clear direction. Even when U.S. policy 
has very clear direction, this does not by itself ensure that it will achieve the results 
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hoped for. Thus, while the policies framed by the Carter administration proved 
fruitful, the policies under Eisenhower did not [Ref. 19:p. 112]. 
The U.S. record regarding the Middle East does not seem to support the 
conventional wisdom that the United States helps Israel because of the influence 
brought to bear on the executive branch by the leadership of the U.S. Jewish 
community. U.S. policy decisions with respect to Israel have been made by 
presidents and foreign policy advisors by themselves, for their own purposes. It may 
be argued that when the United States did not see Israel as supporting the U.S. interest 
in stemming the expansion of Soviet influence in the region, it did not help Israel. 
This was true during the Truman and Eisenhower years. Eisenhower shut off access 
to the White House by leaders of the Jewish community, keeping Israel at arms 
length, and courted Arab leaders in an effort to form an anti-Soviet coalition. [Ref. 
12:p. 27] The Kennedy and Johnson administrations warmed the chilly relations 
between the U.S. and Israel, but did not significantly increase assistance to Israel. 
U.S. leaders, beginning with Nixon and Kissinger, decided that Israel could be an 
asset in the struggle with radical Arabs who were perceived as Soviet clients, and 
began supporting Israel with economic assistance. 
Between the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, U.S. assistance to Israel had 
been limited, and fallen far short of Russian assistance to Egypt and Syria. When 
Egypt attacked on Yom Kippur in 1973, Nixon and Kissinger decided to go all-out 
to provide the assistance necessary for Israel to repulse the Syrian-Egyptian attack. 
It was the position of the administration that the United States could not allow Soviet 
clients armed by the U.S.S.R. to defeat a U.S. client armed by the United States. 
Those Arab client states who would be victorious over Israel would then be beholden 
to the Soviet Union for their victory. Soviet influence in the region would then grow 
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at U.S. expense. An Arab defeat in such a scenario would prove that Russian assis-
tance would always be insufficient to meet Arab goals, and that only the United States 
could help them to achieve what they wanted. While the combatants fought, the 
Soviet Union poured help to her clients, while the U.S. poured assistance to Israel. 
The level of assistance was raised to seven times what it had been the previous year 
[Ref. 12:p. 35]. The United States won hands down, and Israel won the war. The 
United States dominated the diplomacy of the region and the Russians were excluded 
from the Middle East peace process. It was a great victory for U.S. "diplomacy". 
The peace process has dragged on through several administrations. During the 
Nixon administration the Israelis began their withdrawal from the territory they 
captured in the war. During the Ford Administration they returned the critical passes 
into the Sinai and the areas captured in the Golan Heights. During the Carter 
Administration they agreed to return all of the Sinai and offered autonomy to the 
Palestinians on the West Bank. During the Reagan Administration they withdrew 
from the Sinai. Progress toward Middle East Peace has continued through the Bush 
and Clinton Administrations, and U.S. economic assistance is closely tied to that 
progress. 
In his speech given one week after the historic signing of the peace agreement 
between the State oflsrael and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in 1993, 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher summed up the relationship between the U.S. 
and its Middle East neighbors with the following remarks: 
For more than 45 years, Democratic and Republican Administrations 
have worked tirelessly to break the cycle of violence between Israel and 
its Arab neighbors. They did so because they understood that the 
United States has enduring interests in this historic and strategic 
crossroads; enduring interests in a region where conflict always 
threatens world peace; enduring interests in the security and well-being 
oflsrael and in cooperative relations with the Arab world; and enduring 
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interests in the region's oil reserves which serve as the lifeblood of 
much of the global economy. These enduring interests have made 
Middle East peace a constant and essential goal ofU.S. foreign policy. 
For decades, the goal eluded us. The region remained a tinderbox, 
threatening to engulf us in its deadly wars. The volatility was due in no 
small part to the existence of a Soviet Union determined to fuel the 
forces of radicalism and conflict. While the Soviets by no means 
caused the Arab-Israeli dispute, they did everything in their power to 
see that the region remained at a constant boil. Their policies 
emboldened radicals, intimidated moderates, and left Israel-save for 
its friendship with the United States-in a lonely state of siege. [Ref. 
5:p. 15] 
Later in that same speech, Secretary of State Christopher also added: 
I reiterate a simple but profound truth: only an Israel that is strong, 
confident, and secure can make peace. Only an Israel that is certain of 
its strategic partnership with the United States can take the necessary 
risks. On behalf of President Clinton and the American people, I re-
state a long-standing pledge to the Israeli public: as you and your 
leaders contin~e down the courageous path you have chosen, you 
should know that America's commitment to Israel's security and well-
being will remain unshakable. 
It is clear that the U.S. is committed to ensuring that the State of Israel 
maintains a strong, well-equipped military deterrent capability, while it fully 
participates in a fruitful peace process with its Arab neighbors. To this end, the U.S. 
provides on an annual basis, over $4 Billion in military and economic support for 
Israel and Egypt, and has done so for the past 12 years. Such levels of assistance, 
while considerable, are representative of the U.S. commitment to peace in the middle 
east, and the security oflsrael. The level of importance with which the U.S. views its 
strategic relationship with Israel, accompanied by the growing expectation by Israel 
that the U.S. will continue to provide rather substantial levels of support to U.S. 
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interests in the region, have created an evolving relationship unlike any other in the 
service of the U.S. security assistance community. 
2. Israel at Present 
Israel has established itself in a unique partnership with the most powerful 
nation in the history of civilization. It has become a benefactor of all of the wealth 
and power which is at the disposal of the United States, and has deftly established 
itself as one of our strongest allies. As a nation, it knows the importance of the 
relationship that it has with the United States. It demonstrated unparalleled restraint 
during the Gulf War, and since then it has enjoyed the benefits of having done its part 
to keep the U.S.-led coalition intact. No other nation has been as successful at gaining 
favor with the United States as Israel. Today, the U.S. provides more funds on FMS 
and ESP programs for Israel than any other nation in the world [Ref. 1 :p. 28]. Israel 
enjoys this relationship with the U.S. and goes to extraordinary lengths to safeguard 
it, knowing that the future of this relationship is tethered to a fragile Middle East 
peace. 
3. A Look Toward the Future 
In the months following the Gulf War, the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Colin Powell, said that our relationship with Israel was "symbolized 
by the strategic cooperation between both countries, cooperation that benefits both of 
our countries, cooperation that will continue, cooperation that will grow." Defense 
Secretary Cheney said that U.S.-Israeli cooperation prior to, and during the Gulf War, 
"contributed significantly to the allied effort against Iraq." He also added that the 
entire Gulf experience "was a demonstration of the value of maintaining Israel's 
strength, and her ability to defend herself, and also the value of the strategic 
cooperation between our two countries" [Ref. 19:p. 145]. Such high praise was 
reinforced by decisions to strengthen the strategic partnership of the two countries 
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with various military programs of strategic importance. In May, 1991 a formal 
agreement was reached on the funding of the second stage (essentially Phase II, 
Engineering & Manufacturing Development) of the Israeli Arrow Anti-Tactical 
Ballistic Missile (ATBM) program. In addition, the U.S. announced that it would 
provide Israel with ten used F -15A fighters, worth about $65 million, as part of a 
special $700 million drawdown program which had been authorized by Congress the 
previous year. To that point, the administration had not acted on the authorization. 
Of greatest significance, was the announcement by the Defense Secretary that the 
U.S. was pre-positioning significant stockpiles of military equipment in Israel, for use 
in any regional conflict. While U.S. and Israeli officials had secretly agreed to store 
such sto~kpiles in Israel years before, this was the first high-level affirmation of such 
plans. The hardened underground bunkers were already in place when the 
announcement was made [Ref. 19:p. 133]. 
The announcement served to help break down the barriers of both direct 
military-to- military strategic cooperation and fears of alienating the Arab world. The 
announcement also seemed to indicate that U.S. interests were not shifting away from 
Israel and toward the Arab world, but rather that the U.S. was as committed as ever 
to a strategic partnership with Israel. 
It may happen that the future relationship between the U.S. and Israel will 
become more formalized. However, it is just as likely that the relationship will 
continue without the implementation of a formalized defense treaty. While the 
subject does periodically arise, the trend has been to rely less upon formal, written 
treaties, and more upon informal relationships and agreements. Perhaps one possible 
evolution might be for the U.S. to enter into an agreement to come to the assistance 
of Israel only under specific circumstances. Such an agreement might then require 
a full and comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace to ensure U.S. participation. Another 
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consideration of our future strategic posture regarding Israel and the Middle East 
might be to re-configure the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), to involve Israel 
more directly. The pre-positioning of equipment in Israel tends to support such a 
possibility. This idea would require that Israel be assigned a role in U.S. defensive 
planning for the region. 
Alternatively, the future may also bring a strategic cooperation that is quietly 
cut back or stripped of its meaning and significance. Reduced procurement dollars 
for military equipment and construction programs, or even fewer training exercises 
in, and fewer ship visits to, Israel could become an eventuality. 
The future of our strategic relationship with Israel will be based upon three 
basic principles: (1) How the United States defines its strategic interests in the 
Middle East in the future; (2) What military requirements and capabilities the U.S. 
will need in the region; (3) Whether there is the political will in the United States to 
expand cooperation with Israel [Ref. 19:p. 192]. 
C. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM 
1. Background 
As one of the seven components of security assistance, FMS allows for the sale 
of defense equipment to foreign governments. It is a non-appropriated program 
through which the U.S. government may, for U.S. dollars, enter into contracts for the 
procurement of defense articles or defense services for sale to a foreign country. [Ref 
4:p. 253] One of the restrictions that is placed on this program is a legislatively 
mandated "no-loss" concept and an administratively mandated "no-gain" policy, thus 
the customer country must pay all of the costs that may be associated with the sale. 
The customer country is also responsible to pay administrative charges which reflect 
the U.S. government's recoupment of expenses of sales negotiations, case implemen-
tation, program control, and accounting and budgeting. Standard administrative 
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charges include: Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA), 5% 
of the basic sales price; Non-standard items, 5% of the basic sales price; and all other 
FMS orders, 3% of the basic sales price [Ref. 4:p. 292]. 
Foreign Military Sales have become an increasingly-important part of the U.S. 
security assistance program, especially as the Defense Department experiences 
reductions in force structure. The importance of the Foreign Military Sales portion 
of the normal acquisition cycle is also growing in importance, both for the U.S. 
Defense Department and, to a greater degree perhaps, the defense contractor. The 
Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management Journal reports that there are 
currently $228.7 Billion worth of open FMS cases, and that it would take nearly 70 
years to close out all of the open cases, given the average case closure rate of $3 
Billion per year for the previous three years [Ref. 5 :p. 78]. In a recent interview with 
a high-ranking defense contractor who has been involved in the Israeli purchase of the 
MLRS, he indicated that, "FMS represents 30% or more of his business, and that his 
expectations are that the figure will grow." 
2. Legislation 
The legislation that governs the FMS process includes provisions from the 
Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Acts. The relevant FMS 
stipulations of these laws that have application to this research are cited below: 
a. Conditions of Eligibility for FMS 
All foreign governments and international organizations are subject to 
conditions of eligibility before a FMS agreement can occur. These include: defense 
articles may not be sold to foreign governments or international organizations unless, 
the action improves the security posture of the U.S. Government; the customer 
country must be approved by Congressional action; and upon procurement, the 
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customer country must agree to not transfer title of the purchased equipment to an 
unauthorized third party [Ref. 24:p. 725]. 
b. Overseas Management of Assistance and Sales Programs 
The President may assign any member of the Armed Forces to an 
overseas Security Assistance Organization (SAO) for the purpose of implementing 
the equipment and services case management. There is also a direct correlation 
between the role of a SAO and the type and magnitude of a country's security 
assistance program. Those countries with a large FMS, FMFP and IMET programs, 
and those in which the U.S. has definitive strategic or political interests, generally will 
have influential and visible SAOs. Conversely, in those countries where programs are 
small, or which are largely self-sufficient in Foreign Military Sales matters, the role 
and importance of the SAO will be less significant. However, the importance of a 
program vis-a-vis its size may be relative; in some countries, a small program can be 
as meaningful and politically influential as larger programs in other countries. 
Personnel in these SAO positions are responsible for the following activities: [Ref. 
4:p.l02]. 
1. Monitoring the host country's equipment capabilities. 
2. Providing assessments of the equipment in terms of the host country's 
needs. 
3. Providing all U.S. equipment information requested by the host country. 
4. Ensuring that the FMS agreement is implemented in accordance with 
the desires of the host country. 
c. Procurement Sales 
The U.S. government may procure defense items for the customer 
country, if the country agrees to pay the full amount of the purchase cost. Such 
35 
transactions are reimbursed through an FMS agreement between the recipient country 
and the U.S. Government. 
3. FMS Policies Impacting Upon the Sale ofMLRS 
In addition to the Federal laws which govern security assistance, it is also 
important to understand the policies of the Departments of State, Commerce, and 
Defense which impact security assistance programs. 
a. State Department Policies and Regulations 
In the case of the sale of the Multiple Launch Rocket System, the 
International Traffic In Arms Regulation (ITAR) requires that an Export License be 
obtained, since the MLRS is on the U.S. Munitions List, specifically: 
Category IV - Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, 
Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs and Mines 
... (a) Rock.ets (including but not limited to meteorological and other 
sounding rockets), bombs, grenades, torpedoes, depth charges, land 
and naval mines, as well as well as launchers for such defense articles, 
and demolition blocks and blasting caps . 
... (b) Launch vehicles and missile and antimissile systems including 
but not limited to guided, tactical and strategic missiles, launchers, 
and systems. [Ref. 29:pp. 202-7] 
The ITAR stipulates that since this system is on the U.S. Munitions List, the sale of 
the MLRS comes under the jurisdiction of the State Department for export control. 
b. Defense Department Policies 
The DOD Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) 5105.3 8-
M establishes the DOD policies which are relevant to the conduct of Foreign Military 
Sales. The manual states that FMS ofU.S. defense equipment to foreign governments 
should only be approved when consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests. 
Additionally, marketing of defense products should be left to defense contractors, 
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unless specifically approved in advance by the Defense Security Assistance Agency 
(DSAA). 
DOD Manual 5105.38-M, Section 602 sets forth the policy and the 
commercial industry relationship with the in-country Security Assistance Officer 
(SAO). The SAO is the point of contact for commercial industries interested in 
marketing any defense equipment. Tlie SAO is also responsible for assisting with the 
flow of information to potential customer countries. This activity is deemed a 
courtesy to the host government to help them determine whether to purchase through 
direct commercial sales or through Foreign Military Sales [Ref. 29:pp. 602-2]. 
c. Department of the Army Policies and Regulations 
( 1) Army Acquisition Executive Policy Memorandum #90-7, 
dated 30 November 1990: Subject: Security Assistance. This policy disseminates 
the Department of the Army position on security assistance with respect to FMS. It 
emphasizes the Army's commitment to security assistance program and encourages 
the Project Manager to integrate security assistance activities with DOD requirements 
in their respective programs. In additio~, the policy promotes the support of FMS 
cases, and states that although marketing should be left to the contractor, the PM 
should facilitate sales when possible. 
An addendum to this policy further clarifies the role of the PM 
with respect to certain agencies. The policy stipulates that the U.S. Army Material 
Command (AMC) is the Department of the Army executive agent for approved 
security assistance programs. This role is functionally carried out by the U.S. Army 
Security Assistance Command (USASAC), and AMC's major subordinate 
commands. Responsibilities of the PM regarding security assistance and these 
agencies are as follows: [Ref. 38:p. 1] 
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1. Participate in the development and execution of security assistance 
agreements. 
2. Provide advice, assistance, and recommendations to the U.S. Army 
Material Command for the weapon systems. 
3. Consider the possibility for development of an export model of the 
weapon system. 
4. When it will enhance national security interests, provide the materials 
to demonstrate the weapon system to assist in either coproduction or 
sale of the item. This is accomplished in conjunction with U.S. Army 
Material Command (AMC). 
5. Ensure that a continuing flow of information occurs between AMC, the 
major subordinate command security assistance activity, to U.S. Army 
Security Assistance Activity (USASAC) on projects having relevance 
to security assistance programs. 
(2) Army Acquisition Executive Policy Memorandum #91-4, 
dated 28 February 1991: Subject: Matrix Support Policy For Program Execu-
tive Office (PEO) Managed Systems. This policy outlines the Department of the 
Army policy on FMS funding. It specifies that all FMS work should be resourced 
by FMS dollars through the major subordinate command matrix support [Ref. 36:p. 
1]. With respect to the PM, Multiple Launch Rocket System, this translates into the 
Missile Command matrix support agencies supporting all FMS work. Further, if the 
PM must perform FMS work, any Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the 
Missile Command and the PM must include provisions for the reimbursement from 
the appropriate FMS accounts. 
(3) U.S. Army Regulation 12-8, dated 21 December 1990, 
Subject: Security Assistance Operations and Procedures. This regulation 
specifies the policies and prescribe procedures for the sale of items of equipment and 
services to friendly nations. 
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(4) Policy Letter, SUBJECT: FMS Case Management for 
Major Weapon Systems, dated 21 November 1988. The Commanding General, 
U.S. Army Material Command (AMC), General Wagner defined the roles of the 
security assistance agencies that are involved in the implementation of FMS cases, 
and outlined their relative importance to the overall security assistance program. This 
policy is still in effect today and serves to complement both DOD and Army 
regulations on the subject of security assistance [Ref. 32]. 
d. U.S. Army Missile Command Policies 
(1) U.S. Army Missile Command Regulation 12-1, Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) Program, dated 31 October 1991. This regulation outlines 
the responsibilities of the various supporting directorates of the U.S. Army Missile 
Command with respect to FMS. 
In addition, the regulation also defines the responsibilities of the 
Security Assistance Management Directorate regarding FMS cases. These responsi-
bilities include: 
• Development of LOA information to include: 
* Price and availability information 
* Establish and maintain case files 
• Provide all planning information and documentation during the 
implementation of the LOA to include: 
* 
* 
Cost summaries and delivery schedules for both weapon and 
non-weapon mission essential items 
Processing of technical data requests and Technical Data 
Packages (TDP) 





Ensure proper financial accounting 
Make any program changes, if needed 
Requisition of concurrent spare parts 
• Ensure that material is supplied and services are completed to include: 
* 
* 
Delivery to freight forwarder or customer country 
Assisting customer countries on technical matters 
* Providing adequate Quality Assurance inspections [Ref. 37:p. 4] 
(2) U.S. Army Missile Command Regulation 12-5, Security 
Assistance, Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF), dated 26 February 1993. 
This regulation outlines the policies and procedures for use of the special fund where 
material may be required ahead ofthe normal procurement lead times to satisfy urgent 
foreign government requirements. The Security Assistance Management Directorate 
(SAMD) is again named as the focal point for the use of the SDAF, and generally 
coordinates all matters pertaining to the SDAF for MICOM [Ref. 30:p. 3]. 
4. Types of FMS Cases 
There are several types of FMS cases that may be implemented in weapon 
system procurement. These are: (1) defined order, (2) blanket order, and (3) CLSSA. 
Many FMS cases are defined order cases, which specifically delineate the quantity 
and type of defense articles that are to be purchased, as stated in both the LOR and 
LOA. These cases are often referred to as "standard sales" cases by the U.S. Army. 
A blanket order is an agreement between the customer country and the U.S. without 
a definitive listing of items or quantities. This type of case is usually implemented by 
establishing a dollar ceiling against which the customer country is billed until the 
ceiling is reached. The third type of FMS case is the Cooperative Logistic Supply 
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Support Arrangement. This is the logistics support arrangement for follow-on 
sustainment of military hardware that is possessed by foreign countries. The CLSSA 
is one of the main reasons that many foreign customers enter into FMS arrangements 
with the U.S., to gain the benefits of our rather substantial logistics support network. 
[Ref. 16] 
5. Methods For Fulfilling Equipment Sales 
In general, there are two methods for fulfilling the requirements for equipment 
sales under FMS. This may be accomplished by either (1) selling equipment that is 
currently in the DOD inventory, or (2) through the purchase of new production 
equipment. In the case of the MLRS, since it is already in the U.S. Army inventory, 
the MICOM Security Assistance Management Directorate will assign a country 
manager to oversee the case. The MLRS Project Manager then provides the SAMD 
country manager the technical information that is needed to facilitate the sale with the 
customer country. 
In the case of new equipment purchases, the SAMD will assign a country 
manager to provide oversight and assist with the sale during the FMS process. In 
general, the U.S. government procures the new equipment from the producer and then 
resells the equipment on a cash or credit basis to the foreign government, depending 
upon the FMS agreement [Ref. 17]. The security assistance community must make 
the determination, based upon the needs of the customer country, on how to satisfy 
those equipment needs. As an example, equipment that was originally slated to be 
delivered to the U.S. Army may be "bumped" by an urgent FMS case, but this would 
require extensive coordination of all of the security assistance agencies involved in 
the transaction. In such a case, permission for such an action would have to be 
granted by the Department ofthe Army, Deputy ChiefofStafffor Operations (DA, 
DCSOPS). "Bumped" equipment would then be re-paid to DOD through the FMS 
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case. In either case, a production quantity change in the contract between the U.S. 
Government and the contractor would have to be consummated. 
D. FMS CASE DEVELOPMENT 
In order for a customer country to acquire an item of equipment such as the 
Multiple Launch Rocket System from the United States Government, the request for 
such an item of equipment must undergo a very detailed approval process. The 
following is an overview ofthe development of an FMS case, as it passes through the 
various stages of its lifecycle: 
1. Stage 1. Letter of Request (LOR) Stage 
During this stage of the FMS case, the customer country makes a requirements 
determination, and/or solicits information on system capabilities from the U.S. 
Government security assistance community. This when the PM may become 
involved, either by participating in weapon systems demonstrations, or by providing 
information briefings to prospective client countries. Once the customer makes a 
determination that they intend to proceed with the FMS case, they submit the Letter 
of Request to the appropriate security assistance agency. This LOR is addressed to 
the Department of the Army and information copies are sent to DSAA and Secretary 
of State [Ref. 4:p. 155]. DSAA then verifies that the equipment can be sold, that is, 
it verifies that the item is on the U.S. Munitions List and the Military Articles and 
Services List (MASL). Following review of the LOR, the U.S. Government must 
decide whether to accept or reject the request. If accepted, the LOR is forwarded to 
the MICOM Security Assistance Management Directorate. If rejected, the LOR is 
returned to the foreign government with the appropriate negative response. 
2. Stage 2. Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) Stage 
The LOA represents a bona fide offer from the United States Government to 
enter into a contractual agreement with the customer country for the sale of the article 
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of defense equipment. When the LOR is received by the SAMD country or case 
manager~ all of the documentation that is necessary to implement the FMS case is 
begun. The case is assigned the appropriate case number for proper accounting and 
classification purposes. In addition, the U.S. State Department prepares the 
appropriate Congressional notifications of the impending LOA. Ifthe Congress does 
not move to block the sale of the equipment, the LOA is then sent to the foreign 
government for acceptance and signature. The customer country then has up to 60 
days to sign and return the LOA and make the initial payment [Ref. 4:p. 154]. A 
LOA will typically provide a payment schedule, to which the customer country must 
adhere. 
3. Stage 3. LOA Implementation 
In the final stage, once the LOA is signed and the initial deposit received, the 
Defense Financial Accounting Service (DFAS) then releases the obligational 
authority for the Department of the Army to requisition the funds for case 
implementation. The SAMD country manager then initiates the purchase request to 
the appropriate contracting officer to execute the FMS case. At this time the PM is 
officially notified of the LOA implementation. This stage is concluded with the 
delivery of the equipment to the customer country. 
E. FMS CASE OF THE MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM 
TO ISRAEL 
1. System Description 
The Multiple Launch Rocket System is a free-flight, area fire, artillery rocket 
system that supplements cannon artillery fires by delivering large volumes of 
firepower in a short time against critical, time-sensitive targets. The basic warhead 
carries dual-purpose improved conventional submunitions. A growth program is 
under way to add the extended range rocket (ER-MLRS) to permit counterbattery 
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fires at greater distances. The MLRS M270 launcher has been updated to accom-
modate the MLRS family of munitions (11FOM), including the Army Tactical Missile 
System (Army TACMS) [Ref. 31 :p. 1]. This is a basic system description of the 
MLRS as it is configured for the U.S. Army, and neither the ER-MLRS nor the 
AT ACMS variants have been authorized for sale to Israel. Figure 4 shows the 
Multiple Launch Rocket System. 
Source: MLRS Homepage. 
Figure 4. Multiple Launch Rocket System 
2. Background 
Following the dramatic victory ofthe U.S.-led coalition in the GulfWar, many 
nations around the world looked at the technological superiority that was displayed 
by the U.S. military. Several of the weapon systems that were tested for the first time 
under combat conditions proved to be invaluable to battlefield commanders during 
that conflict. The MLRS was one such system. As the world looked on, the MLRS 
turned in a near flawless performance as an artillery system. It soon became known 
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as the "Field Artillery Weapon of Choice" in the international market. [Ref. 13] 
Since that time, at least six nations have sought to purchase the MLRS. 
The U.S. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for MLRS was achieved in 1983. 
In July 1989, the second multiyear contract was awarded for MLRS. In 1994 an 
annual procurement contract for 34 launchers was awarded. Starting in 1989, the 
MLRS has been co-produced by the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, 
France and Italy. As oflast year, a total of744 U.S.-produced launchers have been 
delivered, 656 to the active Army and 88 to the National Guard, and foreign military 
sales. Current plans for improvements to the system include the improved fire control 
system (IFCS), the improved mechanical launch system (IMLS) and the extended 
range rocket (ER-MLRS). The IFCS will mitigate electronic obsolescence currently 
growing in the fire control system, accommodate the needs of the MFOM weapon 
systems under development, and provide growth for future weapon systems. The 
IMLS will provide rapid response to time critiCal targets by reducing time to aim by 
70% and by reducing reload time by 50%. The ER-MLRS will extend the current 
range of the basic rocket from 31.8 km to a new range of about 50 km. The IFCS, 
IMLS, and the ER-MLRS are in the Engineering & Manufacturing Development 
Phase. A single R&D contract will continue through FY 96 with the system's prime 
contractor, Loral Vought Systems, Dallas, Texas, and Camden, Arkansas [Ref. 31 :p. 
1 ]. 
3. The Israeli Approach to FMS 
Since 1984, Israel has received $1.8 billion annually in Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) aid and is the largest recipient ofFMF. Israel's Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) is the procurement authority, responsible for buying the military equipment 
required by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). MOD has established a purchasing 
mission in New York, which is staffed by more than 200 personnel, to handle their 
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high volume of purchases of defense goods and services in the United States. 
Because ofthis unique arrangement, there are no SAO's stationed in Israel. Rather, 
Defense Attache's assist with the MOD's in-country procurement issues. MOD also 
has representatives at defense plants and U.S. military installations to manage 
particular projects. As of this writing, the Israeli MOD had representatives at the 
offices ofUSASAC, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, and were establishing an office 
at the Security Assistance Management Directorate at MICOM, at Redstone Arsenal, 
Alabama. The purchasing mission is responsible for soliciting bids, negotiating and 
awarding contracts, paying contractors, and requesting reimbursement from the U.S. 
Government. In addition, the mission employs a freight forwarder that obtains export 
licenses from the Department of State and Commerce and handles almost all 
shipments to Israel [Ref. 33:p. 9]. 
For it's part, the DSAA's Operations Directorate reviews commercial contracts 
for compliance with the agency's guidelines. The DSAA country desk officer 
reviews the request for conformance with the country's acquisition plan. After this 
review, the DSAA comptroller commits the funds and sends an approval letter to the 
country and the contractor. For Israel, however, coordination takes place between its 
purchasing mission in New York and U.S. officials in Washington. 
There are four important differences between Israel and most countries in the 
rules and review process for commercial contracts. The rules for Israel differ, at least 
in part, due to the sheer volume of its commercial transactions - the purchasing 
mission processes about 20,000 purchase orders annually. 
First, most countries must obtain DSAA approval before the contract is 
executed regardless of the contract value. For Israel, only contracts valued at over $1 
million require prior approval [Ref. 33:p. 10]. Israeli contracts ofbetween $50,000 
and $1 million are submitted to DSAA for approval after-the-fact on a monthly basis. 
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Contracts that are less than $50,000 are not submitted to DSAA, but are retained at 
the MOD. 
Second, for most countries, the total amount of a commercial contract must 
exceed $100,000 to be eligible for FMF; Israel, however, can purchase commercially 
in any amount. 
Third, most countries must submit, through the appropriate Defense Depart-
ment channels, signed contractor certifications along with contracts, but Israel need 
only submit certifications for contracts over $500,000. For lower-priced contracts, 
Israel obtains, but does not submit, modified versions of the contractor certification. 
Finally, for most countries, the contractors submit invoices for payment to 
DSAA through the countries' defense attaches. For Israel, contractors submit 
invoices to MOD's purchasing mission in New York. Israel pays these with its own 
funds and then seeks reimbursement from the DOD, which releases the funds from 
Israel's interest-bearing account at the Federal Reserve bank. Then, on a semiannual 
basis, DOD's Security Assistance Accounting Center reviews a select number of the 
disbursements by examining the associated invoices retained at the purchasing 
mission [Ref. 33 :p. 18]. 
Israel predominantly uses commercial contracts, although its use of FMS has 
increased in recent years in reaction to corruption uncovered in commercial contract-
ing. For example, in 1989 Israel used 84 percent of its FMF, or about $1.5 billion, to 
purchase directly from commercial vendors. By 1992, that figure was reduced to 60 
percent, or about $1.1 billion. Although the majority of the annual FMF allocation 
is spent in the United States, since 1984 Israel has been authorized to spend an 
increasing amount of its funds in Israel [Ref. 33 :p. 31]. 
Commercial contracts financed by FMF have a history of impropriety, includ-
ing fraudulent pricing schemes involving kickbacks and umeasonably high prices. 
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In 1991, Israel convicted one of its top officials, Air Force General Rami Dotan, of 
skimming $40 million in FMF funds by submitting false purchase orders on an F 110 
aircraft engine logistical support contract with General Electric [Ref. 33 :p. 33]. 
Due to the Israeli need for an effective counterbattery weapon system, the 
MOD began pursuing the MLRS shortly after IOC in the U.S. Army, in the mid-
1980s. Political tensions were running high at that time for other reasons, and the sale 
was blocked by a member of the five nation consortium (U.S., U.K., France, Germany 
and Italy) [Ref. 35]. At the time, the sale required approval from all of the member 
nations. At about the same time, Israel was purchasing through the Foreign Military 
Financing program, the U.S. Firefinder counterbattery radar system. Israel had come 
under increasing rocket attacks from Lebanon, and even the West Bank, probably 
from Palestinian groups armed with Russian-made BM-21 Katushyn Rockets [Ref. 
21 :p. 2]. It was because the consortium could not agree to allowing Israel to purchase 
the system, that the LOR was refused for nearly 10 years. 
Because of the tremendous success that MLRS enjoyed during the Gulf War, 
and in part due to the urgent Israeli need for a counterbattery weapon system to 
counter the regional threat they were facing, Israel began pursuing the MLRS in 
earnest following the coalition victory. With the political will of the United States 
behind the effort, the sale was pushed through and a LOA was consummated on 22 
December 1993. 
4. Case Implementation - Phase #1 
The entire MLRS case was unique, in that it required delivery of 6 launchers 
within 12 months of the signing of the LOA. In addition, it required that training on 
the system would take place in the United States, at the U.S. Army Field Artillery 
Center and School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Such a compressed delivery and training 
schedule required extraordinary measures on the parts of both the U.S. Department 
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ofDefense, especially the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 
the Israeli MOD, and the IDF. The first six launchers were originally intended for 
delivery to the U.S. Army National Guard, and had to be "bumped" to accommodate 
the Israeli contract. As previously mentioned, this required approval from the DA, 
DC SOPS. The first contract provided the necessary equipment to completely outfit 
a MLRS battery, complete with iO-ton ammunition trucks, communications 
equipment, 2 years worth of concurrent spare parts, and contractor-provided technical 
support, manuals, and rockets. [Ref. 25:p. 11] 
During the conduct of the new equipment training at Fort Sill, many significant 
obstacles had to be overcome. These included overcoming the language barriers with 
the Israeli soldiers, and of greater significance, rapidly providing English versions of 
the plethora oftechnical support, operations, and maintenance manuals to the Israelis 
for translation into Hebrew. The U.S. does not include translation in its guarantees 
with purchasing nations, and only guarantees the English version of appropriate 
manuals [Ref. 25:p. 16]. The IDF soldiers required their own kosher diet, and special 
dietary arrangements were made to feed _the soldiers. The unique requirements of 
hosting over 100 officers and enlisted soldiers of the IDF during the 10-12 months of 
equipment training provided a considerable logistical challenge to those involved. 
Perhaps the most consequential characteristic of the Israeli case was its tim-
ing - the sale of the first set of 6 launchers literally saved the launcher and missile 
production line at the Camden, Arkansas, Loral Vought Systems plant from going 
"cold" [Ref. 15]. Had this occurred, the near-term cost increases to both the 
contractor and the U.S. government would have dramatically altered the course of 
events for future domestic and foreign sales of the MLRS. This development brought 
the stark realization of the overall importance that foreign military sales may have in 
a project's acquisition lifecycle. 
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The FMF agreement was a 57-page document that consisted of two pages of 
the signed agreement, complete with payment schedule, and thirteen pages of listed 
items of equipment and quantities/estimated prices. The remaining 42 pages of the 
LOA consisted of terms, provisions and special definitions. The general provisions 
ofthe contract included agreements on the following issues: availability of required 
items, components of test equipment and concurrent spare parts, follow-on support 
requirements, and quality assurance team issues. The entire cost of the first purchase, 
including administrative charges, totaled $39,134,042 [Ref. 25:p. 1]. 
5. Case Implementation - Phase #2 
The first phase of the Israeli MLRS purchase was a model of successful 
implementation under the extremely unique conditions imposed by the Israelis upon 
the contractor, defense department, and security assistance community. The under;. 
taking proved to all involved parties that the relationship was solid, intact, and could 
be used effectively to support the Israeli military modernization efforts within time 
constraints. 
Phase 2 came directly on the heels of the first phase, and called for the delivery 
of 42 additional launchers, complete with all of the support equipment required to 
field the equivalent of an enhanced MLRS-equipped Battalion, consisting of a total 
of 8 firing batteries. The equipment list included communications equipment, 
maintenance and recovery equipment, ambulances, training equipment, and Auto-
mated Test Equipment (ATE). Many unique features were included in the second 
LOA with Israel, such as requiring special upgrades and configurations for communi-
cations, as well as special vehicular requirements. Many of these special require-
ments had to be coordinated with the other AMC major subordinate commands, such 
as TAACOM for vehicular specialization, and CECOM for communications 
equipment upgrades. In addition, Israel began seeking support for the construction 
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of a General Support (GS) Depot Maintenance Facility, which would be built in 
Israel. The Second Phase LOA was signed on 14 July 1995 at a cost of$229,292,294 
[Ref. 26:p. 1]. Delivery of the additional systems would be final in February 1998, 
with the delivery of the last 24launchers. It is anticipated that the MOD will seek the 
ER-MLRS and ATACMS in the future [Ref. lO:p.l]. 
The Israeli request for a Depot Maintenance Facility has been approved 
through DSAA and the 5-nation consortium which manufactures MLRS under 
International co-production agreement, and has undergone a study which was 
conducted by both contractor and DOD personnel to determine the viability of such 
an endeavor. During the conduct of the Program Management Reviews (PMR), 
which have been conducted on a semi-annual basis since case implementation, the 
PM works directly with contractor and customer to resolve current issues. The results 
of the study are not yet published, but the facility appears to be headed toward 
becoming a reality in the near term [Ref. lO:p. 11]. Such a facility might raise the 
issue of technical data rights and protection of those rights by the contractor and the 
U.S. government. In an interview with a high-level defense contractor who is 
involved in the case, he stated; "adequate protection measures for data rights are in 
place". The case does reflect the unique needs, and highlights the unique capability, 
that Israel brings to bear upon the FMS process. 
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IV. CASE ANALYSIS: FMS OF MLRS TO ISRAEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an analysis of the foreign military sale of the Multiple 
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) from the perspective of the functional management 
role of both the Project Manager, and the security assistance agencies involved. It 
further examines some of the ethical considerations that faced the PM, and how those 
issues were resolved. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of the 
sale upon the defense contractor, the government, and the defense industrial base. 
B. CASE ANALYSIS 
1. Timelines 
It is important to clearly understand the timelines, terminology, and level of 
complexity that are being investigated in this case study: First, the Foreign Military 
Sale of the MLRS to Israel involves three separate transactions, the first two of which 
have either been completed (case # 1 ), or are in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance 
(LOA) implementation stage (case #2). The first case was for the sale of six 
launchers, with support equipment and training, and was fully implemented in 12 
months. The second case followed immediately after the first, and was for 42 
additional launchers and support equipment, to be delivered through 1998. The third 
case, which is still in the Letter of Request (LOR) stage, involves the establishment 
of the depot maintenance facility in Israel, which is still undergoing a review process 
by representatives of the concerned parties. The analysis of all of these transactions 
involves the study of all three sales, and is characterized as a case study. 
2. Terminology 
Second, the term Foreign Military Sale (FMS), as it applies to the cases 
involving the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and Israel, is a sale that is 
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conducted under the auspices of the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP). 
This simply means that the funds for these purchases are actually provided to Israel 
by Congressional appropriation, and as such, are subject to close scrutiny by members 
of the Legislative and Executive Branches. 
3. Complexity 
Third, and perhaps the most significant factor which impacted the analysis of 
this case, was the true level of complexity that the case represents. Unlike a typical 
FMS or FMFP case, where the DOD infrastructure is well-established and capable of 
providing adequate support to customer, contractor, and Congress, the Israeli case had 
the added complexity of dealing with a 5-nation international partnership. Each of 
these nations had their own issues and agendas which had to be resolved. Positioned 
in the middle of this complex web of inter-related parties, from contractor to 
customer, Congressman to International partner, was the pivotal player in the entire 
process, the Project Manager. Success or failure of the implementation of these 
transactions, and even the project itself, resided with him and his staff. 
C. PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO) ACTIVITIES 
1. Letter of Request Stage - Case #1 
Throughout the LOR stage of the FMS process, the prospective customer may 
seek answers to any number of questions about the system in which they are 
interested, and it generally does not take them long to determine that the PM is the 
expert on the system. The LOR stage is commonly referred to as the requirements 
determination stage. Any questions which a prospective customer country may have 
regarding configuration, capabilities, warranties, support requirements, or anything 
else, may be raised with the PMO. The customer also knows that the PM will answer 
any inquiries from the soldier's perspective, and not from the contractor's perspective, 
and that the PM is bound by law and regulation to conduct business with the 
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prospective customer in an ethical manner. The PMO can answer a broad range of 
questions, from technical characteristics, to employment techniques, or even U.S. 
doctrinal procedures. In a typical situation, there may be special customer 
requirements, as in the first Israeli case, where the MOD stipulated that the vehicles 
which were to be purchased had to have special features included, such as: larger fuel 
tanks, armor plate under the engine and transmission, metric gauges, special 
configurations for IDF-specific communications equipment, and unique electrical 
power requirements and instrumentation [Ref. 25 :p. 24]. The first Israeli case 
included over thirty wheeled and tracked vehicles and trailers which would require 
the specialized configuration, in addition to the six MLRS launchers. In this situation, 
the PMO was able to respond to those questions for the customer, having to get the 
answers or resolve those issues via coordination with the other AMC major 
subordinate commands, such as T AACOM or CECOM. In cases involving the sale 
of the MLRS and individual items of support equipment, DSAA had determined that 
the lead major subordinate command was MICOM, and therefore the PM MLRS was 
in charge during this particular stage of the FMS process. He was therefore the single 
point of contact for answering technical questions about any aspect of the case. The 
other AMC major subordinate commands simply provide matrix support to the PM, 
MLRS to resolve case-specific issues [Ref. 36:p. 3]. 
Investors in the U.S. defense industry such as Israel are very adroit at gathering 
information that they deem pertinent to making prudent weapon system purchase 
decisions. It is because of the availability of the information regarding various 
weapon systems available on the international market, that the customer does not 
simply determine whether or not to pursue the item of equipment, but whether their 
unique needs can be met in a satisfactory manner with the equipment that is available 
to them. Such was the case with the MLRS and Israel. Some of the specific issues 
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which were raised early in the LOR stage of this case focused on using MLRS in the 
harsh terrain and weather conditions of some parts of Israel and the Middle East. 
Information regarding the system was already abundant, and following Desert Storm, 
the volume of information that was available to prospective buyers of U.S. military 
hardware grew tremendously. The PM, MLRS even established a home page on the 
Internet in 1995 [Ref. 31]. With the volume ofbusiness that Israel does with U.S. 
defense industries, they have developed a well-established computer network that can 
access many of the computer network resources of the U.S. Defense Department. 
This capability aided them tremendously in their quest for information regarding 
MLRS. 
Israel had already determined that they wanted the system, and it just became 
a matter of allowing the international consortium to decide when the sale would be 
allowed, or if it would be allowed. It would be naive to assume that Israel was not 
using their vast lobbying resources to help secure the MLRS after Desert Storm. 
Israel viewed their need for the MLRS to be directly tied to a need to be able to repair 
and replace critical components of the system, and their not being tied to a long 
logistics trail back to the United States or to the NATO Maintenance and Supply 
Activity (NAMSA) in Europe [Ref. 13]. Because Israel is constantly on a wartime 
footing, they felt compelled to seek a depot maintenance capability along with the 
MLRS, to avoid that long logistical trail that would be required when having to rely 
on support from either U.S. depots or contractor support under a CLSSA-type 
arrangement. For a long time period, the consortium members publicly disapproved 
of the plan, because the idea of a depot maintenance facility in Israel would mean 
release of at least part of the Technical Data Package (TDP) to Israel. This would 
also mean a loss of some control of the program, and given Israel's record, some 
danger of either reverse-engineering or third-party transfers. Privately, however, 
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there were other underlying issues at hand, mostly of a political and economic nature, 
which were causing the consortium to balk at the Israeli sale [Ref. 35]. In addition, 
the Israelis were manufacturing their own rocket system, the Light Artillery Rocket 
(LAR) 160, which was a potential competitor with MLRS on the international market 
[Ref. 18]. Israel soon became convinced that the MLRS was a better system to meet 
their needs. The depot issue was not resolved by the time the first LOA for MLRS 
was signed. The PM initially presented the idea of a repair facility to the consortium 
membership as a "field maintenance capability" for Israel. No formalized part of the 
first case LOA included provisions for the maintenance facility, but it eventually 
evolved into a separate FMS case for Israel. 
2. The PM Assumes the Lead 
It was during this period of impasse, that several factors became apparent 
which caused the PMO to take up the issue of an Israeli sale with both the MOU 
partners and the security assistance agencies in DOD. First, U.S. contracts for new-
production launchers and rockets were about to reach completion, and the assembly 
lines at the Camden, Arkansas, plant ofLoral Vought would soon go "cold" if new 
business were not generated. Both the PM and the Prime Contractor felt that the 
future of their program would be jeopardized if that were to happen [Ref. 15]. The 
ER-MLRS was the future of the MLRS project, and it was still in the developmental 
(Engineering and Manufacturing Development) stage. Without a contract to fill the 
gap between regular rocket and extended range rocket production, the entire MLRS 
program was in jeopardy. Second, to shut down a rocket production line and 
requalify and restart production would be extremely expensive, and could even be so 
cost-prohibitive as to endanger the extended rocket program. 
The PM was able to orchestrate an effort to break the impasse by the 
consortium membership, and push through an FMS case for the first six launchers. 
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With the potential for more sales to follow in later cases, the consortium agreed to 
allow release of the appropriate information in the TDP, initially to allow for a "field 
maintenance capability". The PM and the prime contractor were able to convince 
both the Pentagon and Congress that they had developed a well thought-out strategy 
for "bridging" the gap between regular rocket and extended-range rocket production, 
using the Israeli FMS case to keep costs under control. The Congressional Staffs 
were so impressed with the creativity which was displayed by the PM and the 
contractor, that they actually added additional funding to the MLRS project for 
purchasing U.S. Army rockets at the economical rate [Ref. 15]. 
This was clearly a unique situation where the PM had to assume the leadership 
position is his capacity as the head of the 5-nation Executive Management 
Committee, and implement some important strategies which might not have been 
popular with the participating nations. The situation required that a deftly-presented 
plan be laid out to the consortium members, the Congress, and the Pentagon. The PM 
assumed the leadership role, accepted the risk, laid out the plan, and the result was a 
win-win-win situation for Israel, the contractor, and the U.S. government. It was~ 
win for Israel because the contract meant that Israel could finally get the MLRS. To 
the contractor, it was a win because the production line was not "broken" and 
employees' jobs remained secure because there was no longer a threat that the 
production line would go cold. For the U.S. government, it was a win because the PM 
was able to bridge the gap, through creative means, to maintain an economical price 
for the rockets required by the U.S. The efforts of the PMO would also enable the 
U.S. to eventually enter into contract negotiations with Japan and Denmark for MLRS 
[Ref. 15]. All of this was made possible by the hard work and dedication of the PM 
and his staff No other agency could have, or would have, been as successful in such 
an undertaking. The PM was in the critical position to make the plan work, and was 
58 
able orchestrate all of the interested parties to implement his strategy to keep the 
MLRS program intact. While the security assistance agencies had various supporting 
roles in this stage of the FMS process, none were equipped to lead and implement 
such a far-reaching strategy. It was therefore incumbent upon the PMO to assume the 
lead throughout this stage. He knew that this would be either his victory, or his 
defeat. Fortunately for the project and all concerned, it was the latter, not the former, 
which resulted. 
3. Developing Themes 
Several interesting themes emerged from the activities of the players in the first 
case, which were perpetuated throughout all of the individual cases with Israel. The 
primary theme which dominated the process was the level of trust and confidence that 
the various parties displayed in the Project Manager. His knowledge of the system, 
hard work, clear vision, and ability to influence and lead disparate groups through 
tough negotiations, proved to be a tremendous asset to the project's success. He was 
able to bridge the gap between the customer, the contractor, the U.S. Government, and 
the consortium membership to implement a plan which enabled all parties to get what 
they wanted, despite the overwhelming complexity of the undertaking. 
The second theme, which developed early in this stage of the FMS process, 
was the tenacity with which the Israelis pursued every aspect ofthe case while it was 
being developed. They constantly prodded, cajoled, coerced, and threatened in order 
to get issues resolved in their favor. They were masters of this game, and were able 
to get the system they wanted, configured the way they wanted it, complete with 
training, spares, and contractor support, all at a bargain price, and delivered to them 
within 12 months of signing the LOA! This theme would carry on throughout all of 
the stages of all of the cases involving Israel. As one DOD official at the DISAM put 
it, "There is never anything typical about the way Israel implements an FMS case" 
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[Ref. 35]. They were constantly demanding more from the contractor and the PM, 
always asking very pertinent questions about system capabilities, prices for spare 
parts, system configuration, and the like. 
In this situation the PM had to serve as facilitator, problem-solver, arbitrator, 
and (sometimes) hand-holder. To characterize the functional role of the PM in this 
somewhat delicate stage of the first case, one could only conclude that the primary 
role of the PM is that of leader. None of the other DOD agencies are staffed to 
perform the leadership role in this stage of the case. While the PMO is not staffed to 
easily handle this level of activity, they are in the best position to assume the lead. 
Another theme that arose from this particular stage of the FMS process was a 
bit more tangible. The costs which were incurred by the PM to get the Israeli cases 
moving in the right direction came from PMO resources, and were not budgeted for 
in appropriations. Every time the PM attended a meeting in Europe or Israel, hosted 
a Program Management Review, or even used matrix support from another AMC 
major subordinate command, the funds ultimately came from Project Office 
resources. Some of these costs are recouped as in administrative charges that are 
collected as part of the LOA. For this $39 million case, the administrative fee was 
$1,123,114.00, much of which does not end up back in the PMO coffers [Ref. 25: 
p.2]. Those administrative charges support all of the security assistance agencies 
involved, primarily DSAA, USASAC, and SAMD. The PMO is not adequately 
funded to be this "proactive" or "creative" when it comes to keeping his project intact. 
A critical relationship that the PM also had to develop and maintain, was his 
relationship with the Program Executive Officer, Tactical Missiles, without whom, 
even greater financial difficulties would have been encountered. 
The ethical considerations that faced the PM during this extremely critical 
stage of the FMS process included both his responsibility to ensure that the MLRS 
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project survived during a potential "dry period", and whether his actions went beyond 
the ethical boundaries of his duties. he recurring theme here is whether the PM 
participated in the marketing of U.S. defense equipment, or established an improper 
relationship with the contractor. The short answer to both of these issues is a 
resounding No. There was no evidence that the PM acted improperly during any of 
the stages of the transaction. Any evidence of impropriety would have to be weighed 
against existing laws and ethics regulations, such as the Joint Ethics Regulation, 
which are somewhat vague on roles and responsibilities for the PMO. This theme 
runs throughout this FMS case, as it does with all other FMS cases. 
Lastly, the relative "value-added" role of the security assistance community 
depended in large part upon individual personalities. Usually, the security assistance 
representative was content to fulfill a support role, and rarely, if ever became a pro;. 
active participant. To varying degrees, the agencies such as DSAA, USASAC and 
SAMD are only required to fill a support role to the Project Office, and only 
participate when called upon. This mind-set of the security assistance community 
may have left the PM with the impression that there was a "leadership vacuum" which 
he was ready, and able to fill. 
4. Letter of Offer and Acceptance Implementation Stage - Case #1 
The implementation of the first Israeli FMS case proved that, even under 
difficult circumstances, a reasonable agreement can be reached by the concerned 
parties, despite the somewhat less than cooperative spirit of the consortium members, 
the hidden agendas and motives. More importantly, the relationship had to grow. 
The implementation stage of the FMS process represents a long-term relationship for 
all concerned; and simply had to work in order to be meaningful. It was during this 
stage that the PM maintained the lead, and chaired the semi-annual Program 
Management Reviews (PMR), with representatives of the contractor, the security 
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assistance community, and the customer (the PM represents both DOD and the 5-
nation consortium in his capacity as the head of the Executive Management 
Committee). From this centralized position, the PM was able to smooth the rough 
edges of the fragile partnership and align the members into a strong coalition. During 
these PMRs, the PM went to extraordinary lengths to resolve issues which were 
presented. 
5. Communications 
The relative importance of communication throughout the FMS process, given 
the set of circumstances and level of complexity surrounding this issue, cannot be 
understated. When one considers consortium member nations, contractors and sub-
contractors, matrix support, and the customer country, the communications network 
spanned nearly half the globe. Not only did the PMO have to establish and maintain 
these networks, but they also had to encourage their use to foster good working 
relationships. The PMO had to remain accessible to all parties, and they had to 
remain pro-active in communicating with, and troubleshooting for, those concerned 
throughout the process. In order to satisfY the needs ofthe Executive and Legislative 
Branches, the PMO reported the progress of the case through the Program Executive 
Office, to his chain of command, and on occasion, directly to Congressional staffs 
[Ref. 15]. 
6. Letter of Request Stage - Case #2 
Due to the utter success of the implementation of case #1, the LOR stage of the 
second MLRS case with Israel was brief. At this point, Israel was pleased with the 
support that it had received from all concerned parties, especially the PMO. The 
training had gone smoothly and MLRS units began training in Israel within a year of 
LOA implementation.· More importantly, Israel had become comfortable with the 
leadership of the PMO, especially from the PM, COL. William Taylor, and the Chief 
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of the International Partnership Office, Mr. John Beale. The Program Management 
Reviews provided the necessary forum for the resolution of problems, and continued 
from the first case into the second. The requirements determination stage really 
consisted of determining the appropriate numbers ofMLRS rockets and launchers that 
would be required to fulfill the artillery delivery system requirements of the IDF. 
Israel was already impressed with the MLRS, and the level of support they could 
count on from the PMO. It came as no surprise to the PMO, when Israel asked to 
purchase an additional42 launchers and all the necessary support equipment, at the 
conclusion of the LOR stage of this case. The entire list of equipment included end 
items such as maintenance vehicles, ammunition carriers, Command Post Vehicles, 
and ambulances. This amounted to enough equipment for the creation of an enhanced 
MLRS-equipped artillery battalion for the IDF, consisting of 8 firing batteries, with 
indigenous support. Of perhaps the greatest significance was the relationship that had 
been established between Israel and the PMO. This relationship would prove to be 
the pivotal instrument in the overall success of the Israeli FMS case. 
What was surprising was the sche~ule under which the Israelis requested the 
equipment be delivered. Once again, they asked for a compressed delivery schedule 
for the first six launchers, and that these launchers once again "bump" or divert the 
last of the deliveries bound for U.S. Army National Guard units. This of course 
required approval from DA DCSOPS, and that approval was ultimately attained 
through the efforts of the PM. The PM' s personal involvement in this stage of the 
LOR process was critical to the success of the second case. The Israelis also 
aggressively campaigned with the prime contractor and government officials to 
negotiate a better price on individual items of equipment, and major end items in the 
second case. They finally reached an agreement and signed the LOA for 
$229,292,294.00 on 14 July 1995 to conclude the LOR stage. 
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7. Letter of Offer and Acceptance Stage- Case #2 
The LOA stage of this case is currently being implemented, and as of April 
1996, the first six launchers had been delivered to Israel along with various support 
and maintenance items of equipment [Ref. IO:p. 3]. This makes a total of 12 
launchers in Israel, with which the IDF can conduct training. Of the remaining 36 
launchers, 12 are scheduled for delivery in July 1997, and the remaining 24 are to be 
delivered by February of 1998. Through the PMR, Israel has already indicated that 
they are interested in increasing the number of rockets that they intend to purchase, 
and wish to purchase the ER-MLRS rockets, even if they are purchased from Low 
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) from Lockheed Martin Vought Systems. (In March 
1996, Lockheed Martin bought Loral Vought Systems, and on 23 April 1996 the 
company was officially re-designated Lockheed Martin Vought Systems). As of 
April of 1996, a final decision on whether the ER-MLRS will be sold to Israel had not 
yet been made, whether from LRIP, or regular production. For this $229 million 
contract, the Administrative Charge to the Government of Israel (GOI) was in the 
amount of$6,642,040.00 [Ref. 26:p. 2]. 
Another interesting aspect of this stage of the second case is the pace and 
tempo with which the Israelis are conducting their training. Compared with U.S. 
MLRS units, the Israelis have logged between five and ten times the number of 
tactical distances in which they have participated in training exercises with MLRS 
[Ref. 15]. The intensity and frequency of the training which is being conducted by 
the IDF has led to some maintenance issues for Israeli MLRS units, which are being 
resolved via the PMR. The Israeli maintenance personnel who are involved with 
MLRS are very skillful at coming up with creative solutions to the problems they 
encounter. Some information sharing is occurring between the on-site contractor 
personnel and IDF maintenance personnel. This is leading to overall improvements 
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in the MLRS system, and the ability of the IDF to conduct sustained training missions 
with minimal time between failures. 
8. Letter of Request Stage - Case #3 
The third Israeli case, which is scheduled to have a signed LOA by June of 
1996 is for the MLRS depot maintenance facility in Israel. Israel has an established 
infrastructure for the maintenance of similar systems, but needed to be capable of 
conducting depot-level maintenance operations specifically for MLRS. To this end, 
they are pursuing the creation of such a facility in Israel. The depot facility will 
probably not require construction of new facilities, but will likely be attached to 
facilities that are already established. This means that the biggest requirement will 
be the provision of the proper tools required to conduct depot maintenance on MLRS. 
This will probably be accomplished by the PM, MLRS' implementing contracts 
through the MICOM Integrated Materiel Management Center for the purchases of the 
necessary tools and equipment. Another important aspect of this case, as alluded to 
earlier, involves the release of the appropriate levels of data from the TDP to Israel 
to allow them to perform depot-level maintenance. This will be worked out through 
the PMO, the International Consortium, and the contractor. Of course, adequate data 
rights protection measures will be implemented. 
The depot maintenance facility met resistance for various reasons early-on, but 
the PM was personally instrumental in keeping this issue alive, because he recognized 
that the Israelis could only pursue MLRS in earnest if it came with an indigenous 
depot-level maintenance capability. Israel simply could not rely on U.S.-based depots 
or NAMSA for depot maintenance. The PM first presented the idea as a field 
maintenance capability, which later evolved into a full depot facility for Israel. This 
clever technique of slowly getting the partnership members used to the idea of 
allowing Israel to have such a facility, as well as laying the groundwork for the 
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establishment ofthe facility to satisfy the Israelis, proved to be the best compromise 
possible. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the FMS process, the Security Assistance agencies provided 
adequate levels of support to the Project Manager. They were not as proactive as the 
PMO, nor did they provide any more assistance than was specifically requested, and 
in large part their level of effort could be attributed to individual personalities/ 
workloads. It became obvious at an early stage of the Israeli case that the Security 
Assistance Community was neither equipped nor inclined to take the lead in the case 
implementation. It was clearly the job of the PM to assume that role, both in his 
capacity as the head of the Executive Management Committee of the International 
Consortium, and as the central figure for customer, contractor, and U.S. Government. 
While it was the leadership aspect of the PMO which won the day regarding 
successful case implementation, despite the difficult schedules and complexities, the 
funding was generally provided through project assets. Through each of the stages 
of the FMS process, the PM frequently had to go to extraordinary lengths to 
accomplish the mission. The ethical aspects of the case which centered on whether 
the PMO either participated in the marketing ofU.S. defense equipment or established 
an improper relationship with the contractor, while certainly considerations in all 
FMS cases, were not seriously at issue here. The PM acted in a prudent, ethical 
manner throughout the case time period, and should be lauded for his efforts. The 
most important aspect ofthe role that the PM assumed in the case was that ofleader. 
Without this central figure, operating in an aggressive, pro-active manner to achieve 
the goals of all the disparate parties, the project would have failed. In bringing these 
disparate groups together the way the PM was able to, and by forming them into a 
cohesive team, they were able to overcome tremendous adversity, and create a win-
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win-win situation for customer, contractor, and U.S. Government. In this era of 
shrinking defense budgets, the impact of the utter success of the MLRS program, due 
in large part to the success of the Israeli FMS case on the contractor, government, and 





The end of the Cold War has brought security to the United States at a 
tremendous price. It has been replaced by a struggle to create and sustain both 
democratic institutions of government and market economies throughout the world. 
The United States is leading the move toward creating a new international system 
which has democracy as its foundation. We will clearly benefit from the consolida-
ion of democratic economies by diminishing the threat of war, and expanding 
economic opportunities for us and our allies. The transfer of defense articles, 
services, military training, and economic assistance provides the catalyst for such 
economic expansion. Security Assistance, in particular the Foreign Military Sales 
Program, supports our foreign policy objectives, and has become a critical component 
of our foreign policy. 
Many friendly and allied nations throughout the world are seeking to build and 
maintain modem military forces which provide a credible deterrent to regional 
conflict. In their attempts to gain the best technological capability that is available, 
these nations are seeking to purchase weapons and military hardware from the United 
States. The tremendous success that was enjoyed by the U.S.-led coalition during the 
Gulf War has caused interest in U.S. military technology to increase dramatically. In 
many instances, our allies began to express interest in weapon systems which were 
proven for the first time in modem warfare. The Multiple Launch Rocket System 
(MLRS) is one such system which proved itself during that conflict. Israel has set out 
to modernize its current artillery capability by supplementing its tube artillery with 
the MLRS. Such a modernization effort represents a quantum leap for the military 
capabilities of Israel. The FMS case of the MLRS to Israel has served to help clearly 
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define the roles with which the security assistance community must now operate, and 
to expand the role of the Project Manager during all of the stages of the FMS process. 
With the surge of interest in the new military technology that the U.S. has to 
offer on the international market, comes the realization that the roles of the security 
assistance community and Project Manager are going to have to change dramatically. 
Prior to the increased interest in new technology, the security assistance community 
provided the leadership throughout the FMS process, and the PM normally had little 
involvement in such transactions. Obsolete or excess items of defense equipment that 
were sold to friendly nations often had little or no PM involvement in those 
transactions, and the security assistance community did the majority of the work in 
making the transfers. The role and responsibility of the PM has increased 
dramatically with increased sales of new weapons and equipment. The security 
assistance community has assumed more of a support role for the PM in these efforts. 
B. PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO) SHORTCOMINGS 
DURING FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) TRANSACTIONS 
The Project Management Office is. not adequately resourced to manage FMS 
transactions, and funding for their efforts must come from project assets or from 
resources provided by Program Executive Office (PEO). The Project Manager knows 
that some administrative fees are charged to a typical FMS transaction, but that those 
fees are ultimately recouped by the entire security assistance community, and not just 
the PMO. These administrative fees are intended to offset those administrative and 
overhead expenses incurred by all of the participants in the FMS process, but not to 
provide capital gains. In addition, there is no clear guidance provided to the PMO 
regarding their roles and responsibilities in the FMS process. Such a lack of defined 
roles and responsibilities often creates a "leadership vacuum" which requires the PM 
to assume the lead in the FMS process. Also, the ethical considerations which face 
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the PM in the conduct of an FMS transaction may sometimes come into play. For the 
most part, the ethical guidelines that are given to the PM are often vague and even 
conflict with other regulations and policies, depending upon whose interpretations are 
being used, and what the results of those interpretations are. The basis for the ethical 
manner in which the PM must perform his duties in FMS transactions is twofold: 
first, the PM may not participate in the marketing of defense equipment, and second, 
he must not engage in an improper relationship with the defense contractor. Beyond 
those two very basic requirements, there is very little clear guidance given to 
prescribe the ethical behavior with which the PM must conduct FMS transactions. 
C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Funding 
When it becomes clear that a new item of equipment or weapon system will 
be offered for sale to our allies, the appropriate level of funding required to facilitate 
the foreign military sale of such equipment must be made available to the Project 
Manager. Such funds may come from PEO resources, the Department of Defense 
(through the DSAA), or through separate appropriation by Congress. In large part, 
many newer programs have sufficient funding to facilitate these types of new 
equipment sales. As in the case of the foreign military sale of the MLRS to Israel, the 
PM had to very carefully manage his resources in order to consummate the 
transaction. Of course some of those expenses can be recovered, in the form of the 
administrative charges that are applied to all FMS cases. The FMS of new weapon 
systems requires that funding be provided to the Project Manager in advance of the 
sale, because that is when a large percentage of the work is accomplished by the 
PMO. The timing of the funding is as critical a component of the successful 
implementation of the FMS case, as is the funding itself. In this vein, the Program 
Executive Office (PEO) may have some inherent flexibility built into its budget to 
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help support the efforts of PMs who are involved in new production FMS 
transactions. However, funding must be earmarked in the budgeting process to 
support and sustain FMS transactions for the PM. By doing so, the PM will know 
what resources can be used in the FMS process, and can better manage those assets 
to accomplish his intended goals with increased efficiency. Simply stated, this places 
the resource directly in the hands of the user. 
There will be an increase in the future sale of weapon systems such as the 
MLRS to Israel. As stated in the case analysis, Israel is expressing interest in the 
MLRS extended range rocket, and ATACMS. £Ms will require adequate funding to 
participate in this type of transaction, and to assure the success of their individual 
programs. As more customer countries become involved in the acquisition process, 
the expenses incurred by the PMO in managing an increased number ofFMS cases 
will increase dramatically as well. It is therefore essential that the PM and the PEO 
adequately prepare for future FMS transactions as they conduct acquisition planning, 
and participate in the planning, programming and budgeting cycle. By doing so, they 
will be able to provide better service to their customers, and operate with increased 
efficiency. The funding aspect of FMS transactions, as it relates to the activities of 
a typical PMO, cannot be understated in its relative importance to a program. FMS 
is gaining importance in the acquisition cycle, and just as with every other aspect of 
the acquisition cycle, must be properly planned and implemented. 
2. Roles and Responsibilities 
It became clear during the conduct of the FMS of the MLRS to Israel that the 
security assistance agencies (Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), U.S. 
Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), and the Security Assistance 
Management Directorate (SAMD) at the U.S. Army Missile Command) that were 
involved in the case held supporting roles behind the PM. They generally participated 
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in the approval process, or provided some other administrative service. The PM was 
clearly in charge, due in large part to the level of trust and confidence that he 
engendered from the interested parties. By his very position within the center of the 
circle of customer, contractor, and U.S. Government, the PM could adequately 
manage the program. Yet nowhere is there guidance that clearly defines the roles and 
responsibilities of the PM and the security assistance community. 
Many published regulations are vague and subject to interpretation, and quite 
often they even conflict with regulations from other agencies. This lack of clear 
guidance concerning the roles and responsibilities of the individual agencies may 
have created a lack of leadership in this particular case, but the PM saw it as his duty 
to assume the lead throughout the entire FMS case. Any senior Army Officer who 
finds himself in a similar situation, without clearly-defined roles for the relevant 
actors, will assume the lead in the absence of explicit guidance. It is inherent in their 
training for them to assume command of the situation in the absence of clear lines of 
authority. COL. (Ret.) William Taylor, who was the MLRS PM during the critical 
stages of the sale to Israel, said of this situation, "I was AI Haig in this situation, I felt 
that it was my responsibility to assume the leadership role" [Ref. 15]. 
Clearly defined roles and responsibilities are needed to effectively and 
efficiently manage the foreign military sale of extremely complex weapon systems 
such as the MLRS. The Department of Defense should consolidate into one single 
regulation, or supplement the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) to 
empower the Project Manager with the unambiguous authority to provide the 
leadership throughout the entire FMS process for new equipment purchases. No other 
individual is in a better position to accomplish this task, and facilitate the transaction 
than the PM. As the Israeli case also illustrated, the PM has to work very hard to help 
facilitate the transaction, despite the disparity of the different groups with which he 
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had to deal. Many obstacles had to be overcome in order to successfully implement 
the case, primarily due to the individual efforts of the Project Manager. While the 
primary role of the Project Manager in this case was the of leader, it is also important 
to recognize the importance of the role that he fulfilled as facilitator. The Project 
Manager's role as the leader and facilitator of the FMS case were the most critical 
components of the program's ultimate success. 
3. Ethical Considerations 
During the FMS case of the MLRS with Israel, the PM may not engage in the 
following activities: the marketing of defense equipment, and establishing an 
improper relationship with the defense contractor. It is a common occurrence during 
the Letter ofRequest (LOR) stage of an FMS case, that the Project Manager is asked 
to participate in either a capabilities demonstration or answer questions regarding 
system capabilities. In the Israeli case, the PM answered a great number of questions 
for the Israelis on the MLRS. He also went to considerable lengths to help facilitate 
the sale, by encouraging the consortium members that it was in their best interest to 
move in this direction. This however, does not constitute marketing of defense 
equipment. In fact, the relevant policy requires that the PM facilitate sales whenever 
possible. It therefore becomes a matter of judgment for the PM to use his discretion 
in facilitating such sales. If in his good judgment he can help to facilitate such a sale 
without impropriety, then there is no ethical dilemma. It may be that the regulations 
intentionally give wide discretionary authority to the PM in this situation, to allow 
him to make the appropriate decision, based upon relevant circumstances. It appears 
that current policies and regulations give a great deal of latitude to the Program 
Manager to conduct business as he deems appropriate, within the guidelines that he 
is provided. 
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There is a need for clear, distinct regulatory guidance regarding the ethical 
behavior that the PM may, and may not participate in when involved in FMS 
transactions. By incorporating into the roles and responsibilities of the PM in these 
types of activities, and eliminating any conflict or confusion within the various 
agency regulations, the PM will be better able to act within the framework of the 
ethical boundaries that are set out in the regulations. Such clarification will allow 
better interpretation of the ethical responsibilities of the persons who are involved in 
the FMS process. These clear guidelines will also serve to assist the PMO in the 
oversight process, whereby each member of the PMO is fully aware of the ethical 
limitations of his or her office. When a PMO can operate with clear understanding 
of their ethical boundaries, then there can only be an improvement in the efficiency 
of the entire operation. This effort will also help to reduce wastefully redundant 
regulations and policies that clutter every level of the security assistance hierarchy. 
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What is the functional management role of the Project Manager in 
the Foreign Military Sale~ process? 
Based upon the analysis that was provided in Chapter IV, the functional 
management role that the PM should assume is that of leader and facilitator 
throughout the entire FMS process. 
2. What agencies are responsible for supporting the Project Manager 
in the Foreign Military Sales process, and how did they impact this 
case? 
Information provided in Chapters II and IV indicated that the primary agencies 
that are involved in the Foreign Military Sales process are the Department of the 
Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, (DA DCSOPS), Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA), U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), 
and the Security Assistance Management Directorate (SAMD), of the U.S. Army 
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Missile Command. These agencies provided the administrative support and served 
as the approval authority for many ofthe stages of the FMS case. They acted to help 
facilitate the case that was managed throughout by the PMO, and they received much 
of their guidance from the PM. The impact that these agencies had upon the Israeli 
case was minimal, and in some instances the PM actually performed the duties of the 
security assistance agency. 
3. What activities did the PM actually perform that may have been 
outside of his scope of responsibility? 
In his capacity as facilitator, the PM went to sometimes extraordinary lengths 
to implement the FMS case with Israel. In this regard, he personally used his 
influence to gain approval from DA DC SOPS for the diversion of the first twelve 
MLRS launchers that were intended for U.S. Army National Guard units. This not 
only accommodated the needs of the customer, but also served to balance the needs 
of both the contractor and the government by keeping the production lines going. 
Additionally, the PM helped to develop the idea of the depot maintenance facility 
with the members of the international consortium. His efforts eventually led to the 
signing of two separate LOAs for the MLRS with Israel, given the prospect of 
developing a depot maintenance capability in-country. 
4. What ethical considerations did the PM face throughout this case? 
The PM had to be certain that he was not participating in the marketing ofU.S. 
defense equipment, nor involved in an improper relationship with the contractor. The 
PM is bound by regulation to carry out all of his duties in an ethical manner and to use 
great care when conducting FMS transactions. Because of the proximity of the 
program to the PM, great care must also be exercised in precluding the appearance of 
· impropriety. In the absence of clear guidance on what constitutes this conflict of 
interest by the PM, it becomes difficult to assess the ethical boundaries within which 
the PM had to operate. 
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5. Whose responsibility is it to protect the data/intellectual property 
rights of the defense contractor in this case? 
If the data/intellectual property rights of the defense contractor are solely the 
property of the defense contractor, then it is incumbent upon the contractor to 
properly safeguard those rights. If all or part of the data/intellectual property rights 
are owned by the government, then it is the responsibility of the government to ensure 
their security. In the MLRS case, the data rights were the property of the defense . 
contractor, Lockheed Martin Vought Systems. 
6. Is the Israeli FMS case of the MLRS representative of the future of 
our Foreign Military Sales Program? 
In many ways the FMS case of the MLRS to Israel is indicative of the future 
of our foreign military sales program, because it highlights the need for expanded 
markets of new equipment sales. It also points out that roles and responsibilities for 
the PM and the security assistance community have changed, from the traditional 
security assistance transactions of the past. The case also served to emphasize the 
relative importance of the PMO in the overall FMS process. In the acquisition cycle, 
the relative importance that FMS is gaining in new equipment sales cannot be 
understated. 
7. What unique features does this case include when compared to 
other FMS cases? 
The case involved the international partnership that co-produces the MLRS, 
which brought a unique dimension to the FMS process. It also incorporated the depot 
maintenance facility for Israel, which proved to be a significant challenge to case 
implementation. The timing aspect of the case, which literally saved the MLRS 
rocket production line from going "cold" was a unique feature of this transaction. The 
timeline which was required by the Israelis for the delivery of the first twelve 
launchers proved to be a unique feature of the case as well. 
77 
8. What were the lessons learned from this FMS case? 
I. The PM is the expert on the system, and he lends credibility to the 
overall program. 
2. The PM is the leader and facilitator of the entire FMS transaction. 
3. The PMO is not adequately funded to perform all of the functions 
required by FMS transactions. 
4. Current policies do not adequately define the roles and responsibilities 
of the PMO and the security assistance community in FMS transac-
tions. 
5. The PM is proactive; the security assistance community is reactive. 
6. Current policies lack clear guidance on the marketing of defense 
equipment during the FMS process. 
7. A solid, healthy relationship between the PMO and the contractor is 
essential to successful FMS case implementation. 
8. Success or failure of a program resides with the PMO in new 
equipment FMS cases. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Impact of the world-wide transfer of arms to customer countries and 
whether such transfers equate to increased danger to American interests abroad. The 
sale of defense equipment to other countries helps the U.S. defense industrial base, . 
but at what cost? Are we flooding the world market with too many weapons? Are 
our allies, the benefactors of such sales, really acting responsibly when they acquire 
U.S. defense articles? 
2. Cost reduction measures aimed at reducing the redundant infrastructure 
that is our security assistance community should be examined. This effort would 
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entail examining and developing recommendations for the consolidation of security 
assistance offices and agencies. Such a reduction could streamline the security 
assistance process by eliminating redundancy and increasing efficiency. 
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